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Abstract 
 
Objectives An Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder proposes that 
cognitive styles characterised by extreme self-referent appraisals of internal states (e.g., ‘If I have a 
bad night’s sleep it means that I am about to have a breakdown’) interfere with mood regulation. The 
aim of this study is to determine whether strong endorsement of such appraisals is predicted by a 
diminished ability to access disconfirming counterexamples.  
 
Design We examined whether the ability to access two different categories of counterexample (known 
as Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes) would predict endorsement of extreme appraisals 
(measured by the Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive Predictions Inventory; HAPPI) and mania risk 
(measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale; HPS).  
 
Method A non-clinical sample of 150 students completed the HAPPI, the HPS and a conditional 
reasoning task that indexed the ability to access Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes. Current 
mood was controlled for using the Internal States Scale.  
 
Results The ability to make use of disabling counterexamples during the reasoning task was inversely 
related with scores on the HAPPI (r= -.19, p<.05); participants that were less able to make use of 
disabling counterexamples endorsed extreme self-referent appraisals to a greater extent. There was no 
association between the use of alternative cause counterexamples and the HAPPI, and no association 
between either measure of counterexample generation and the HPS.   
 
Conclusions A diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence when reasoning about the world may 
reinforce problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalised appraisals of experience, which 
can interfere with mood regulation. 
 
 
Key words: Reasoning bias; Conditionals; Beliefs; Counterexamples; Bipolar Disorder; Appraisals; 
Hypomanic Personality 
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Practitioner points 
 Problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalised appraisals of experience may be 
reinforced by the inability to produce or access evidence that disconfirms these maladaptive 
beliefs.  
 This reasoning bias may be associated with cognitive styles underlying psychopathology.  
 There may be clinical utility in exploring the use of disabler generation in psychological 
interventions, to help disconfirm maladaptive beliefs. 
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Extreme cognitions are associated with diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence 
 
An Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder (ICM; Mansell, Morrison, Reid, 
Lowens & Tai, 2007a) proposes that cognitive styles characterised by extreme self-referent appraisals 
of internal states (e.g., mood and activation) interfere with effective mood regulation among 
individuals with bipolar disorder, as well as in the general population. According to the ICM, these 
self-referent appraisals can be positive or negative; for example, “If I feel excited, then the world is 
full of unlimited opportunities” or, conversely, “If I feel excited, then I am about to have a 
breakdown”. These online (in-the-moment) appraisals of internal state are informed by latent 
metacognitive beliefs and are measured by the theory-driven Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive 
Predictions Inventory (HAPPI; Mansell, 2006; Dodd, Mansell, Morrison & Tai, 2010). The HAPPI is 
made up of 61 statements describing self-referential and extreme appraisals about internal states (see 
example A below).  
 
a) If I have a bad night’s sleep[then] it means that I am about to have a breakdown  
 
According to the ICM, those who strongly endorse such statements are less able to effectively 
regulate their mood, a key characteristic of bipolar disorder (see Mansell et al, 2007a). Bipolar 
disorder is characterised by a heterogeneous symptom profile, including mood states that are elevated, 
irritable, depressed and anxious. The ICM and research supporting its clinical utility stresses that 
vulnerability to mood swings arises from having extreme appraisals that are multiple, and conflicting. 
It is this push and pull between conflicting interpretations of the same internal states that underlies the 
multifaceted and dynamic nature of bipolar disorder, as well as mood swings in non-clinical groups.  
This has been supported by research reporting associations between extreme self-referent appraisals 
of internal state and hypomanic personality traits (thought to confer risk of mania) and with both high 
and low mood in non-clinical populations (Dodd, Mansell, Morrison & Tai, 2011a; Dodd, Mansell, 
Bentall, & Tai, 2011b). Extreme appraisals are also associated with mood and functioning in people 
with diagnosed bipolar disorder (Dodd, Mansell, Morrison & Tai, 2011c; Fletcher, Parker & 
Manicavasgar, 2014). These individuals endorse extreme appraisals to a greater extent than those with 
unipolar depression and non-clinical controls (Alatiq, Crane, Williams & Goodwin, 2010; Kelly, 
Mansell, Wood, Alatiq, Dodd & Searson, 2011; Mansell, 2006). 
 
In this paper we propose that the degree to which extreme self-referent appraisals are endorsed is 
related to individual differences in the more general cognitive ability to access latent, disconfirming 
evidence (i.e., counterexamples retrieved from memory). The spontaneous activation of 
counterexamples should reduce the extent to which extreme appraisals are endorsed by weakening the 
cause-effect link. For instance, an individual  might be less likely to endorse example A (see above) if 
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they can readily access beliefs that disconfirm this appraisal (e.g., “I have had a bad night’s sleep 
many times in the past and not had a breakdown”; “I would seek help before having a breakdown”; 
“I am a resilient person” and so on).   
 
In support of this hypothesis, a number of studies in cognitive psychology have shown that the 
endorsement of everyday cause-effect statements is influenced by the availability of implicit, 
disconfirming counterexamples. For example, Cummins (1995; see also Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & 
Rist, 1991) showed that people are less likely to endorse logical inferences from cause and effect 
statements that have many implicit counterexamples, such as example B, relative to statements that 
have few implicit counterexamples, such as example C. 
 
b) If John studied hard, then he did well on the test. [Many Counterexamples] 
c) If Joe cut his finger, then it bled. [Few Counterexamples] 
 
The two most common types of counterexample are known as Disabling Conditions and Alternative 
Causes. Disabling conditions are latent factors that might prevent an effect even though the cause 
occurs (e.g., John studied the wrong topic; John was ill and missed the test). Alternative causes are 
additional latent causes that might result in the same effect (e.g., John cheated; the test was very easy). 
Disablers cast doubt on the sufficiency of a cause to bring about an effect; whereas alternatives cast 
doubt on the necessity of a specific cause (Cummins, 1995; Sellen, Oaksford & Gray, 2005).  
 
While the aggregated results from non-clinical samples show that people are generally able to access 
and use implicit counterexamples (e.g., Cummins, 1995), these findings overlook what might be 
important individual differences. This is particularly relevant as Harvey, Watkins, Mansell and 
Shafran (2004), in a review of the cognitive and behavioural processes across psychological disorders, 
have questioned whether such experiences are related to a generally reduced ability to access and use 
disconfirming evidence. Indeed, theory and evidence suggests that a diminished ability to access and 
use disconfirming evidence is associated with aspects of psychopathology among both clinical and 
non-clinical samples (Galbraith & Manktelow, 2015; Sellen et al., 2005).  
 
 
The current study 
The evidence reviewed above suggests that the degree to which extreme appraisals of internal state 
are endorsed may be influenced by access to implicit, disconfirming counterexamples. We 
hypothesise that people with a generally diminished ability to access latent counterexamples will 
endorse extreme self-referent appraisals to a greater extent than those who routinely access such 
disconfirming evidence. Specifically, we predict that a diminished ability to access disabling 
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counterexamples will be associated with greater endorsement of extreme self-referential appraisals. 
Disabling counterexamples can weaken any given cause and effect relationship by creating doubt 
about the sufficiency of a stated cause (e.g., having a bad night’s sleep) to bring about an effect (e.g., 
having a breakdown); the more readily those disabling counterexamples are accessed, the more doubt 
that is created. An impaired ability to identify disabling conditions to self-referent appraisals, should 
therefore lead to greater endorsement of those appraisals.   In contrast, we predict no such association 
between the ability to generate alternative causes and the endorsement of extreme self-referential 
appraisals. This is because alternative causes provide an alternative way to achieve the same outcome 
(i.e., they influence the perceived necessity of a cause), but should not influence the perceived 
strength of a given cause and effect relationship (Cummins, 1995).   
 
To reveal individual differences in the ability to utilise implicit counterexamples we employed a 
conditional reasoning task developed by Cummins (1995). This task requires participants to generate 
logical inferences from everyday statements such as examples  B and C (above), which vary in the 
number of latent alternative causes and the number of latent disabling conditions (see method section 
for more details). This task was used by Sellen et al. (2005) to reveal an association between one 
aspect of schizotypy (Impulsive Nonconformity) and the tendency to overlook latent counterexamples 
in a non-clinical sample of students. To do this, they calculated a Disabling Conditions Index and an 
Alternative Causes Index for each participant in their analogue student sample. These indexes 
measured the ability of participants to make use of alternatives and disablers, respectively. In the 
study reported below we examine whether individual differences in the ability to use alternatives and 
disablers (as measured by the Alternative Causes Index and the Disabling Conditions Index) is 
associated with the extent to which extreme appraisals are endorsed (as measured by the HAPPI).  
 
In line with Sellen et al. (2005), a non-clinical sample was recruited. Continuum conceptualisations of 
mental illness argue that psychological distress lies on a continuum with every day experiences, and 
that the same processes underlie clinical and non-clinical manifestations, as opposed to more 
categorical conceptualisations of mental illness (Walsh, Royal, Brown, Barrantes-Vidal & Kwapil, 
2012; Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff & Bentall, 2013). The ICM (Mansell et al., 2007) was developed 
to explain mood dysregulation in non-clinical populations as well as bipolar disorder, and in support 
of this, previous evidence has demonstrated that extreme appraisals of internal states are associated 
with both high and low mood, as well as mania risk, in non-clinical populations (Dodd et al., 2011a, 
b; Dodd et al., 2010). It is hypothesised that participants who strongly endorse extreme appraisals (as 
measured by the HAPPI) will also have the tendency to not use implicit disabling counterexamples. In 
addition, given that the endorsement of extreme appraisals is associated with mania risk (Dodd et al., 
2010, 2011b) we sought to examine whether impaired counterexample generation contributed to this 
risk, as measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Because 
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current mood state is often associated with the endorsement of beliefs about internal states (Dodd et 
al, 2011a-c), we measured and controlled for this in our analyses.   
 
 
Method 
Participants 
An opportunity sample of 150 students (128 female; mean age 20.3 years) completed this web-based 
study. The majority were psychology students from University X (n=128) and took part for course 
credit. The remainder were volunteers from University Y and received no incentive. A further 49 
volunteers (43 female; mean age 19.9 years) began the study, but withdrew by closing their web 
browser before completion. All of these individuals failed to provide any data on at least one of our 
four measures, with most withdrawing at an early stage in the protocol. Data from these withdrawn 
participants were excluded.  
 
Materials  
Internal State Scale (ISS) (Bauer et al., 1991). To control for the effect of current mood on reasoning 
and questionnaire responses, the ISS was completed by all participants. The four subscales of the ISS 
measure different internal states: Activation, e.g. ‘Today my thoughts are going fast’ (Cronbach’s α 
=.80); Perceived Conflict e.g., ‘Today I feel irritable’ (α =.75); Depression e.g., ‘Today I feel 
depressed’ (α = .81); and Well-being, e.g., ‘Today I actually feel great inside’ (α =.75). Participants 
rate to what extend they feel the way described in each of 15 items on a visual analogue scale from 0-
100. The scale has been associated with clinician-rated measures of symptoms (Bauer et al., 1991). 
 
Conditional inference task (Cummins, 1995). This is the task originally developed by Cummins 
(1995) and used by Sellen et al. (2005) to examine the link between counterexample generation and 
schizotypy. The latter used data from this task to calculate an Alternative Causes Index and a 
Disabling Conditions Index. These indexes measure the ability of participants to make use of latent 
alternative causes and latent disabling conditions.  
 
Participants were presented with 16 ‘if…then…’ conditional statements (e.g., “If the trigger was 
pulled, then the gun fired”). Cummins (1995) collected pre-test data in which participants were asked 
to explicitly identify alternative causes and disabling conditions for each statement.  These data were 
used to group each of the statements into one of four categories i) ‘many alternatives, many disablers’, 
ii) ‘many alternatives, few disablers’ iii) ‘few alternatives, many disablers’ iv) ‘few alternatives, few 
disablers’ (see Appendix 1 for full list of items and their pre-test ratings). An example of a latent 
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disabling condition might be that the gun was not loaded, whereas an example of an alternative cause 
might be that the gun was faulty.   
 
Each of the 16 statements was presented in four different contexts. These contexts contained the 
conditional statement, a minor premise (i.e., a fact relating to the conditional statement) and a 
conclusion that corresponded to each of four logical inference types (known as Modus Ponens, Modus 
Tollens, Denial of the Antecedent and Affirmation of the Consequent). Figure 1 illustrates the four 
types of inference that participants were asked to evaluate for each of the 16 items. Participants rated 
64 permutations in total (16 statements x 4 inference types).  They were asked to rate how sure they 
were that the given conclusion could be drawn, using a seven point scale anchored at -3 (very sure I 
CANNOT draw this conclusion), zero (Can’t tell), and +3 (very sure I CAN draw this conclusion).   
 
**FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE** 
 
From the reasoning task data we calculated a Disabling Conditions Index and an Alternative Causes 
Index for each participant, using the formula devised by Sellen et al. (2005). The Disabling 
Conditions Index is the sum of acceptance ratings for all MP and MT inferences with many disabling 
conditions subtracted from the sum of acceptance ratings for all MP and MT inferences with few 
disabling conditions. Higher scores on this index mean that participants are more able to access and 
use implicit disablers. Likewise, the Alternative Causes Index is the sum of all acceptance ratings on 
AC and DA inferences with many alternative causes subtracted from the sum of all acceptance ratings 
on AC and DA inferences with few alternative causes. Again, higher scores on this index mean that 
participants are more able to access implicit alternative causes.  
 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). The HPS is commonly used in 
research as a measure of mania, or bipolar disorder, risk. Forty eight true-false items relate to a 
personality style characterised by traits such as self-confidence, ambition, and emotional 
responsiveness (e.g., ‘In unfamiliar surroundings, I am often so assertive and sociable that I surprise 
myself’, ‘I seem to be a person whose mood goes up and down easily’). It has been associated with 
future diagnosis of bipolar disorder (Kwapil, Miller, Zinser, Chapman, Chapman, & Eckblad, 2000), 
bipolar symptomatology (Walsh et al., 2012) and psychological processes relevant to bipolar disorder 
(Kwapil, Barrantes-Vidal, Armistead, Hope, Brown, Silvia, & Myin-Germseys, 2011). In our sample, 
Cronbach’s α was .73.  
 
Hypomanic Attitudes & Positive Predictions Inventory (HAPPI; Mansell, 2006; adapted by Dodd et 
al., 2010). The extended 61-item HAPPI (Dodd et al., 2010) measures positive and negative extreme, 
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self-referent appraisals of internal states, primarily activated states e.g., ‘When I feel good, I know that 
whatever I do, I could do no wrong’, ‘When my moods drive upwards there is nothing I can do about 
it’. The majority of these statements are expressed in the conditional form ‘if p, then q’ or ‘when p, 
then q’.  Participants endorse how much conviction they have in each of these 61 beliefs on a visual 
analogue scale from 0-100. Responses to this measure were used to calculate an overall mean HAPPI 
score (Cronbach’s α = 0.96) and six subscales, named Increasing Activation to Avoid Failure (α 
=.73), Loss of Control (α =.80), Regaining Autonomy (α = .80), Social Self-Criticism (α = .89), 
Success Activation (α = .85) and Grandiose Appraisals (α = .74).  
 
Procedure  
Approval was granted by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee at University X 
and the University Y Research Ethics Committee. The study was run entirely online using Qualtrics 
survey software. Volunteers were provided with a URL for the study and completed it at their 
convenience. Each participant gave informed consent and then completed the ISS, conditional 
inference task, HPS and HAPPI in that order. Items on the ISS, HPS and HAPPI were presented in the 
same order to each participant. Each participant saw the 64 items of the reasoning task in a different 
random order.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
We aimed to find out if the Disabling Conditions Index and Alternative Causes Index would predict 
the endorsement of extreme appraisals (as measured by the HAPPI) and mania risk (as measured by 
the HPS), while controlling for current mood (measured by the ISS) and potentially confounding 
demographic factors. To identify potential confounding variables, independent samples t-tests were 
used to assess gender differences in the outcome variables, and Pearson’s correlations to check 
relationships between outcome variables and age. In order to examine the association between 
counterexample generation and extreme appraisals of internal state we first used Pearson’s 
correlations to examine the extent to which the HAPPI and HPS correlated with our two measures of 
counterexample generation (the Disabling Conditions Index and Alternative Causes Index). We then 
followed up significant correlations using hierarchical multiple regression in order to reveal the 
unique contribution of counterexample generation to the variance in extreme appraisals of internal 
state, while controlling for current mood and demographic factors. These potential confounding 
variables were entered in the first step, and our measure of counterexample generation entered in the 
second step. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
A missing values analysis revealed a limited amount of missing data (<0.1% of questions were 
unanswered, with a maximum of 1.3% missing from any one item). Missing data points were imputed 
using Expectation Maximisation.  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables.  Mean 
HAPPI score was comparable to those previously published for students (Dodd et al, 2011b reported a 
mean of 29.97 and a standard deviation of 12.85), and lower than those of a group diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder (Dodd et al, 2011c reported a mean of 41.96 and a standard deviation of 19.41). 
Likewise, the mean HPS total score for our sample was comparable to previous studies that have 
recruited a student sample (Dodd et al, 2011b reported a mean of 15.98 and a standard deviation of 
8.23).  When exploring demographic variables, age was significantly correlated with the HAPPI mean 
score (r = -.16, p = .045) but not with HPS total score (r = -.08, p=.316).  There were no gender 
differences on either the HAPPI mean score t(148) = -.33, p =.741 ) or the HPS total score t(148) = -
.24, p =.81). 
 
**TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE** 
 
Counterexample generation and extreme appraisals  
Results from bivariate correlations are displayed in Table 2. These revealed that the Disabling 
Conditions Index was negatively correlated with the HAPPI mean score and five out of six of the 
HAPPI subscales; meaning that increased endorsement of extreme appraisals was associated with a 
decrease in the use of disabling counterexamples.  There was no relationship between the Alternative 
Causes Index and the HAPPI mean or any of its subscales. The Activation, Conflict and Depression 
subscales of the ISS were significantly correlated with the HAPPI mean, as was the HPS (r = .481, 
p=<.0001). There was also no relationship between either of the counterexample generation measures 
and the HPS.   
 
**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE** 
 
To further explore the significant relationship between the HAPPI and the Disabling Conditions 
Index, a hierarchical multiple regression was conducted. This allowed us to reveal the amount of 
unique variance explained by the Disabling Conditions Index after potential confounding variables 
were first included in the model. The dependent variable was HAPPI mean score. In step one, we 
controlled for potentially confounding factors that were correlated with HAPPI mean score (ISS 
Conflict, ISS Depression, ISS Activation, HPS total score, and Age). In step two we additionally 
entered the Disabling Conditions Index (see Table 3).   
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Step one accounted for 38.5% of the variance in the HAPPI mean score (R2 =.385, p <.001).  The 
addition of the Disabling Conditions Index in step two significantly increased the amount of variance 
explained by our model (R2 change = .03, p < .01). Table 3 shows that in step one ISS Depression and 
HPS had a positive unique association with mean score on the HAPPI. In step two, ISS Depression 
and HPS continued to have a positive unique association, whereas the Disabling Conditions Index had 
a negative unique association with mean score on the HAPPI. 
 
 
**TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE** 
 
 
Discussion 
The Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder (Mansell et al., 2007a) 
proposes that cognitive styles characterised by extreme self-referent appraisals of internal state 
interfere with effective mood regulation. In this study, those who strongly endorsed extreme 
appraisals tended to be less able to access disabling counterexamples, even when controlling for 
current mood, mania risk and age. Disabling counterexamples cast doubt on the sufficiency of a cause 
to bring about an effect. Respondents with high scores on the HAPPI displayed a generalised 
tendency to overlook these disabling conditions during the reasoning task. In other words, they were 
less willing or less able to access disconfirming evidence (c.f. Harvey et al., 2004). Therefore, the data 
presented above provide preliminary evidence that strong endorsement of extreme self-referent 
appraisals (e.g., “If I have a bad night’s sleep it means that I am about to have a breakdown”) is 
associated with a generally diminished ability to access latent disabling conditions. The size of the 
effect was small, but this reasoning bias may be one of the mechanisms by which extreme appraisals 
are initially accepted, and why they persist.  
 
There was no such association between scores on the HAPPI and the Alternative Causes Index. This 
may be because alternative causes do not disconfirm extreme appraisals to the same extent as 
disabling conditions. When considering example A (see Introduction), thinking of alternative causes 
for having a breakdown is less likely to diminish belief in this statement than thinking of reasons that 
actively disable the cause and effect relationship. However, it is possible that alternative causes may 
play a role in the initial generation of extreme appraisals, which is a process not measured by the 
HAPPI. For example, people may rapidly reject extreme appraisals of an internal state change if they 
are able to think of many alternative appraisals.  
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Likewise, neither of the reasoning indexes were associated with mania risk (as measured by the HPS). 
As mentioned above, it may be that these reasoning processes play a role in the development of 
cognitive styles relevant to mood dysregulation, rather than directly underlying risk of mood 
dysregulation per se. However, it is important to note that in previous research the HAPPI has 
explained more unique variance in bipolar mood symptoms than the HPS (Dodd et al, 2011b), so it 
may be that this cognitive style is actually more predictive of bipolar disorder than hypomanic 
personality.  
 
Limitations and future directions 
Of course, further research is necessary to disentangle these processes. Firstly, the reasoning task 
focused on everyday cause and effect statements and did not directly measure the ability to form 
counterexamples to extreme appraisals. It would be interesting to see if the null finding for mania risk 
was still present when using more emotionally-salient stimuli for conditional inferences, or if a mood 
induction was used prior to undertaking the reasoning task. Secondly, while we argue that using less 
disconfirming evidence may play a role in the development of extreme appraisals, further research is 
required to determine the direction of this relationship. From our theoretical perspective, impairment 
in the general cognitive ability to access disconfirming evidence should influence the more specific 
evaluation of extreme appraisals. However, further research is required to evaluate the possibility of a 
bi-directional relationship.  
 
There is also an important question about whether a lower score on the disabling conditions index 
reflects an inability to use disconfirming evidence or a reduced willingness to use disconfirming 
evidence, and whether this is an implicit or explicit process. To help with these points, links with 
related cognitive mechanisms, such as episodic memory, could also be explored. For example, are 
people with greater endorsement of extreme appraisals able to generate disablers for these types of 
belief about internal states if directly asked?  The ICM (Mansell et al, 2007) suggests that the 
metacognitive beliefs that inform appraisals of internal states are themselves formed through life 
experiences, including life events dependent on mood. In this non-clinical sample, this could be (for 
example) the experience of being shunned by friends after being too hyper; in Bipolar Disorder, this 
could be something as distressing as hospitalisation due to a manic episode. If there are few 
counterexamples stored in memory to refute appraisals such as ‘If I feel excited, I’m going to have a 
breakdown’, this would help to perpetuate such appraisals. 
 
Finally, this study recruited a non-clinical sample of individuals, who are less likely to have 
experienced significant highs or lows of mood and attached extreme and self-referent meaning to 
these experiences; on average, this group had lower endorsement of extreme appraisals of internal 
states than individuals with bipolar disorder. To optimise applicability to clinical interventions, it is 
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vital to determine if these findings extend to clinical samples. Clinical applications of the ICM 
(Mansell, 2007; Mansell, Morrison, Reid & Lowens, 2007b; Searson Mansell, Lowens & Tai, 2011) 
highlight the importance of showing service users how their extreme appraisals are influencing their 
behaviour and exacerbating their mood difficulties. Dimished use of disablers may interfere with the 
ability to disconfirm maladaptive beliefs or generate normalising appraisals, meaning individuals are 
less able to step out of the following cycle: extreme appraisal of internal state change – behavioural 
response – further internal state change – further self-referent extreme appraisal. There may therefore 
be clinical utility in further exploring the use of disabler generation in therapeutic contexts, including 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (cf. Balzan, Woodward, Menon & Moritz, 2015). If service users are 
able to explicitly identify disabling conditions when they experience an extreme appraisal of internal 
state, then it may reduce the likelihood of these appraisals being accepted and maintained.  
 
Conclusion 
The data we report suggest that extreme appraisals of internal state may be driven to some extent by a 
generally diminished ability to access disconfirming evidence. The ability to use disabling 
information appears to be at least one of the cognitive processes that accounts for variation in the 
endorsement of extreme appraisals. This novel finding has implications for the Integrative Cognitive 
Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder and may have some clinical utility. Indeed, finding that 
conviction in beliefs and appraisals that are extreme and personalised may be fuelled by a more 
general reasoning bias has implications for the study of maladaptive cognitive styles in general.  
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Appendix 1 
Conditional statements used in the reasoning task.  Pre-test data, taken from Cummins (1995), shows 
the mean number of alternative causes and disabling conditions that were generated by participants 
for each item.  
 
Conditional Statement 
Mean number of 
alternative causes 
Mean number of 
disabling conditions 
   
Many alternative causes, many disabling conditions   
1. If fertilizer was put on the plants, then they grew quickly. 4.2 3.4 
2. If the brake was depressed, then the car slowed down. 4.7 3.1 
3. If John studied hard, then he did well on the test. 3.9 4.4 
4. If Jenny turned on the air conditioner, then she felt cool. 3.9 3.6 
   
Many alternative causes, few disabling conditions   
5. If Alvin read without his glasses, then he got a headache. 4.4  1.5 
6. If Mary jumped into the swimming pool, then she got wet. 4.2  2.3 
7. If the apples were ripe, then they fell from the tree. 4.2  1.9 
8. If water was poured on the campfire, then the fire went out. 3.8  2.2 
   
Few alternative causes, many disabling conditions 2.0  2.9 
9. If the trigger was pulled, then the gun fired. 1.8  2.7 
10. If the correct switch was flipped, then the porch light went on. 1.6  3.7 
11. If the ignition key was turned, then the car started. 1.9  3.7 
12. If the match was struck, then it lit.   
   
Few alternative causes, few disabling conditions   
13. If Joe cut his finger, then it bled. 0.7  2.1 
14. If Larry grasped the glass with his bare hands, then his 
fingerprints were on it. 
0.8  1.9 
15. If the gong was struck, then it sounded. 2.5  2.0 
16. If the doorbell was pushed, then it rang. 2.3  2.5 
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Figure and Table captions 
Figure 1: Example of the four types of inference that participants were asked to evaluate for each of 
the 16 conditional statements.  Following each Statement and Fact they were asked to rate how sure 
they were that the given Conclusion could be drawn, using a seven point scale. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the HAPPI subscales, ISS subscales, HPS and counterexample 
indexes.  
Table 2: Correlation between our outcome variables (HPS and HAPPI) and measures of 
counterexample generation, current mood and age.    
Table 3: Table 3: Hierarchical regression model with HAPPI mean score as the dependent variable (β 
coefficients are standardised).  
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Figure 1 
Figure 1: Example of the four types of inference that participants were asked to evaluate for each of 
the 16 conditional statements.  Following each Statement and Fact they were asked to rate how sure 
they were that the given Conclusion could be drawn, using a seven point scale. 
Inference Statement Fact Conclusion 
Modus Ponens “If the trigger was pulled, 
then the gun fired” 
 
The trigger was pulled. Therefore, the gun fired. 
Modus Tollens “If the trigger was pulled, 
then the gun fired” 
 
The gun did not fire. Therefore, the trigger was not pulled. 
Denial of the 
Antecedent 
“If the trigger was pulled, 
then the gun fired” 
 
The trigger was not pulled. Therefore, the gun did not fire. 
Affirmation of 
the Consequent 
“If the trigger was pulled, 
then the gun fired” 
The gun fired. Therefore, the trigger was pulled. 
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Table 1 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the HAPPI subscales, ISS subscales, HPS and counterexample 
indexes. 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 
HAPPI     
HAPPI mean 32.16 13.63 1.31 69.18 
Increasing activation to avoid failure 36.88 16.69 0 78.57 
Regaining autonomy 29.07 19.59 0 78 
Social self-criticism 20.27 16.96 0 77.78 
Success activation and triumph over fear 40.88 17.34 0 82.22 
Loss of control 39.97 19.36 0 81.67 
Grandiose appraisals of ideation 31.08 17.61 0 74 
ISS     
ISS Conflict 166.16 91.82 10 489 
ISS Depression 59.29 49.61 0 200 
ISS Wellbeing 153.97 54.68 5 288 
ISS Activation 180.95 97.50 9 445 
HPS     
HPS total 16.03 7.90 3 39 
Counterexample indexes     
Disabling Conditions Index 6.54 9.95 -14 38 
Alternative Causes Index 23.67 18.26 -15 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Table 2: Correlation between our outcome variables (HPS and HAPPI) and measures of counterexample generation, current mood and age.    
   HAPPI subscales 
 HPS HAPPI 
mean 
Increasing 
Activation 
Loss of 
Control 
Regaining 
Autonomy 
Social Self-
Criticism 
Success 
Activation 
Grandiose 
Appraisals 
Disabling Conditions Index  -.121 -.190* -.177* -.098 -.162* -.175* -.210** -.184* 
Alternative Causes Index -.028 -.079 -.104 .104 -.073 -.095 -.073 -.122 
ISS Conflict .131 .388** .399** .348** .393** .408** -.011 .087 
ISS Depression -.033 .333** .432** .332** .324** .368** -.127 .027 
ISS Wellbeing .224** -.100 -.245** -.142 -.150 -.194* .310** .128 
ISS Activation .485** .450** .450** .430** .394** .315** .249** .280** 
Age -.082 -.164* -.142 -.129 -.075 -.144 -.068 -.092 
**p<.01, *p<.05 
Table 3 
Table 3: Hierarchical regression model with HAPPI mean score as the dependent variable (β 
coefficients are standardised).  
Predictor variables HAPPI mean 
Step 1 (R2 =.385) B SE B β 
(Constant) 21.13 5.99  
Age -.46 .29 -.12 
ISS Conflict .01 .02 .08 
ISS Depression .07 .03 .25* 
ISS Activation .02 .01 .12 
HPS total .71 .13 .41** 
Step 2 (R2 =.415)    
(Constant) 23.47 5.92  
Age -.49 .25 -.13 
ISS Conflict .02 .02 .10 
ISS Depression .07 .03 .25* 
ISS Activation .02 .01 .11 
HPS total .68 .13 .39** 
Disabling Conditions Index -.24 .09 -.18** 
**p<.01, *p<.05 
 
 
